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AN EARLY REPORT BY KURT GERSTEIN1 
 
 
Historical knowledge, although it tends to be forgotten, is often times a 
matter of luck.2 The past, in short, is not exactly what was, but rather 
what we have been able to find out. The history of the report on the 
extermination of the Jews, published here for the first time in a language 
other than Dutch, provides a perfect illustration. 
It has taken more than a half a century for the true importance of this 
document to come to light. Unknown, ignored, then underestimated, it 
proves that the detailed information provided by Kurt Gerstein and 
concerning the Operation Reinhard extermination camps was indeed 
transmitted to London by the Dutch resistance in mid 1943. 
This article first traces the history of this transmission before making 
several succinct proposals for analysis of this document. 
 
I. Informations from Kurt Gerstein transmitted to London 
The story begins with Kurt Gerstein, in the middle of the summer of 
1942. A member of the “Hygiene Institute” of the Waffen SS, Gerstein 
received an order in June from Rolf Günther, Eichmann's deputy, to go to 
the Operation Reinhard extermination camps, which had gradually begun 
functioning the previous spring, to modify the mode of operation of the gas 
chambers. At that time, the gas chambers of Belzec, Sobibor and Treblinka 
used diesel engine exhaust gas, and needed to be adapted to the use of 
Zyklon B, an extremely toxic disinfecting gas employed since September 
1941 to exterminate Soviet prisoners of war, followed by the Jews in 
Auschwitz, and then in other camps. The visit took place from August 17 to 
19 and did not achieve its purpose, because the “modernization” plan for 
the gas chambers was purely and simply dropped for reasons that we only 
partially understand. It is clear however that Gerstein's lack of enthusiasm 
                                                     
1 I would like to thank Henk Biersteker, Pieter Lagrou, Céline Chateau, 
Robert Kloots and Benoît Majerus for their assistance in the preparation and 
writing of this article, most of whose source material is in Dutch. I would also 
like to extend my gratitude to the Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, for 
its support. 
2 Jean Stengers develops this idea however in a small book entitled Vertiges de 
l'historien. Les histoires au risque du hasard. Le Plessis Robinson, Institut 
Synthélabo, 1998. 
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to take part in this criminal undertaking, and the reticence of Christian 
Wirth, the head of the three camps to change the modus operandi of killing 
by making it more dangerous to his people by the use of a highly toxic gas, 
doubtless played a decisive role in the abandonment of the plan. 
This visit however had one direct outcome whose repercussions would be 
felt for many years; namely to turn Kurt Gerstein into an eye witness of 
genocide by gassing carried out in the camps of Belzec and Treblinka. 
Deeply shocked by what he had witnessed, Gerstein never ceased in his 
attempts to warn the world about the on-going genocide. As soon as he left, 
in the train taking him from Warsaw to Berlin, Gerstein made a detailed 
description of the exterminations being carried out against the Jews in 
Belzec to a member of the Swedish delegation in Germany, Baron Göran 
von Otter. Similar contacts took place until the end of the war, with a 
Swiss diplomat, Paul Hochstrasser, and a large number of influential 
members of various Protestant denominations, such as Otto Dibelius. In 
short, Gerstein contributed greatly to breaching the wall of secrecy with 
which the Nazis attempted to conceal the extermination of the Jews. 
In this capacity, Gerstein should clearly be seen as a great resistant. At 
the same time however, his activities within the Institute of Hygiene of the 
Waffen-SS, as much as we know about it, has its dark side. It is likely that 
he played a major role in the distribution of Zyklon B within the Waffen-SS. 
It is also likely that Gerstein was involved in a series of regular orders of 
this same gas for shipment to Auschwitz and Oranienburg, where it is 
certain that its original destination was criminal, and that it may have 
been directly connected to the policy of genocide of the Jews. Gerstein 
claims, although the documentation to date cannot confirm it, that he 
prevented the gas from being used for other purposes than disinfecting. 
Thus, Saul Friedländer was right to call Gerstein the incarnation of 
ambiguity, even if this was the ambiguity of Good he was referring to.3 By 
specifying the likely category of ambiguity, Friedländer was in a certain 
way echoing the intense fascination elicited by this historical figure over 
many years, in particular during the 1960s.4 
                                                     
3 Saul Friedländer, Kurt Gerstein ou l'ambiguïté du bien, Paris, Casterman, 
1967. 
4 This fascination was originally prompted by a play by Rolf Hochhuth, Le 
Vicaire (Paris, le Seuil, 1963, for the French translation; the Representative, also 
performed as The Deputy, 1964 for the English translation). It condemned the 
silence of the Holy See during the War concerning the fate of the Jews. The 
plot revolves around the figure of Gerstein. The considerable success of the 
play, and the polemics it elicited, had numerous repercussions in France, as can 
be seen by the book by Jacques Nobécourt, Le Vicaire et l'histoire (Paris, le 
Seuil, 1964) as in Germany and elsewhere in Europe (see on the subject of this 
“Kontroverse”, the 17 entries listed by Michael Ruck in his Bibliographie zum 
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This fascination arose from a single source: the series of testimonies in 
French and German which Kurt Gerstein wrote to Rottweil in April-May 
1945, several months before he committed suicide in the Cherche-Midi 
prison in Paris, where he was facing charges of murder and complicity. It is 
an understatement to say that this testimony had a major impact on the 
historiography of genocide. Like the Höss memoirs, the “Gerstein report” 
contributed decisively to shaping our view even today of the homicidal 
gassing of Jews in the extermination camps.5 
 
The document reproduced at the end of this article is directly related to 
the efforts to provide information to neutral and allied countries. It is easy 
to reconstruct the way in which this information passed from Germany to 
Holland. Gerstein had been the friend of a Dutch industrialist , Ubbink, 
since the beginning of the thirties. In 1941, while Gerstein, a young 
volunteer conscript in the Waffen-SS was training at Arnhem, he re-
contacted Ubbink, at Doesburg, and the two friends maintained their 
relationship until almost the end of the war. In February 1943, Ubbink 
visited Gerstein in Berlin: 
“With great indignation he told me how the gassings took place using 
the exhaust gas from diesel engines. He gave me all the details and told 
me that at that time there were 9000 deaths per day in the three 
camps. At the beginning I didn't want to believe him at all, but his 
show of emotion and state of psychic collapse more than the fact that he 
swore, gave me the conviction that a secret had been revealed to me 
that only a very few people knew. […] He asked me if I could get in 
touch with people who had radio contact with London. I told him I 
could. He asked me, no-- more than that, he begged me to transmit this 
story to England, so it would be known all over the world, and that the 
German people could be warned.”6 
                                                                                                                               
National-Sozialismus, Cologne, Bund Verlag, 1995). More specifically on 
Gerstein himself, aside from the book by Saul Friedländer and a series of 
articles by Léon Poliakov in Le Monde Juif, there was also a biography by 
Pierre Joffroy (L'espion de Dieu. La Passion de Kurt Gerstein, Paris, Grasset, 
1969, new edition 1992). The interest in Gerstein has not waned, as is shown 
by the new biography by Jurgen Schäffer, Kurt Gerstein- Zeuge des Holocaust. 
Ein Leben zwischen Bibelkreisen und SS, Bielefeld, Luther Verlag, 1999). 
5 On this point, I refer to a paper entitled “Comment écrire l'histoire sans 
archives. A propos du camp d'extermination de Belzec” to be published by 
Complex, in Brussels in the year 2000, in a collective work under my 
editorship, entitled Le génocide des juifs entre procès et histoire. 
6 Letter from J.H. Ubbink to Erika Arajs, Department of Justice in Nuremberg, 
dated September 14, 1949 (this is a copy, Landeskirchliches Archiv Bielefeld, 
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Ubbink indeed passed on the information given to him. “I kept my 
word” wrote Ubbink – who added “but they did not at that time believe 
such a horrifying story.”7 The disbelief he encountered, or felt he had 
encountered, as we will see later – profoundly affected him. In 1947, he 
had already revealed his sentiment to the widow of Kurt Gerstein,8 and he 
would not say differently, fifteen years later, to the historian Lou de Jong.9 
Like Ubbink, obviously, Gerstein remained convinced that he had 
delivered his testimony without having been believed. In one of the versions 
of his report, in April 1945, he discusses this reaction of disbelief: 
“In the year 1943, the Dutch resistance asked Ubbink to tell me that I 
was requested not to provide invented atrocities but to be satisfied to 
report the truth alone.”10 
Several weeks later, writing to Ubbink doubtless from his cell in the 
Cherche-Midi prison, he exclaims: “Ask your friends if now, at least, they 
believe what happened in Belzec, etc.”11 
Gerstein/Ubbink was the first link in the chain. Both were convinced 
during the war and doubtless until their deaths12, that the risks they had 
taken were in vain, that no one wanted to believe that the extermination 
was a reality, and that nothing would be done to stop the ongoing 
massacres. 
 
                                                                                                                               
Bestand Gerstein, n.365). As of 1946, Ubbink confirmed to Gerstein's widow 
that the information had been passed on through him to the Dutch resistance 
(letter to Elfriede Gerstein dated August 3, 1946, ibidem, n.334). 
7 Ibidem, idem. 
8 He wrote to her: “The reality of what he told me about the 'concentration 
camps' was never believed at the time, in 1943 by the Dutch resistance 
movement.” (Letter from J.H. Ubbink to Elfriede Gerstein dated January 31, 
1947, ibidem, n.463a). 
9 Louis de Jong, “The Netherlands and Auschwitz”, Yad Vashem Studies on the 
European Jewish Catastrophe and Resistance, n.VII, 1968, p.45. 
10 Version of the Gerstein report in French, dated May 6, 1945, deposited in the 
National Archives in Washington. 
11 Letter from Gerstein to J.H. Ubbink. This letter was found in the personal 
effects of Gerstein after his death and sent to his wife in 1949. After a copy 
(which I use here) was made, (Landeskirchliches Archiv Bielefeld, Bestand 
Gerstein, 5.2. Teil `1,5,7, Fase 2) it was then sent to Ubbink who then lost it 
(letter from Ubbink to Pastor Weiselberg, dated July 22, 1967, ibidem, 5,2, Teil 
1 N 2 Fasc 1.). 
12 This was true for Gerstein, and doubtless for Ubbink, who emigrated to 
Canada, where it is possible that he never knew about the report published 
here. 
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 Let us turn now to the second link in the chain, another loop, namely 
Ubbink's correspondents in the Dutch resistance. Because of his actions in 
the rescue of persecuted Jews, Ubbink was in touch with Cornelius Van der 
Hooft, who in turn was associated with the clandestine Calvinist 
newspaper Trouw. Ubbink sent Van der Hooft Gerstein's testimony in 
February or March 1943. Van der Hooft manifested extreme caution or 
disbelief, and Ubbink “had a great deal of difficulty convincing the leader of 
the resistance of the veracity of [his] report,” as he explained to Joug in 
1963.13 
Nevertheless, as of March 19, the newspaper Trouw alluded to the fate 
in store for the Dutch Jews: 
“We must never forget what this usurper [the German occupier] inflicts 
upon us, how he in his cowardly way assassinates the most noble and 
pure of the nation, how he makes mass arrests of our best fellow 
citizens and imprisons them in these evil places where cruelty and 
sadism reign, how he sacks our country with a brutality never before 
equaled in all our history, how he robs us of our valiant laborers in order 
to force them to work like Pharaoh made the Israelites, how coldly and 
in the most inhumane manner, he strips our Jewish fellow citizens and 
then assassinates them […]”14 
As brief as it was, thus buried in the long list of offences and crimes 
destined to prick peoples' consciences, this mention was nevertheless the 
first denunciation of the persecution of Jews, published by the underground 
newspaper Trouw. It is likely, or at least possible that this was the first 
echo of the information Gerstein gave to Ubbink. 
Several days later, on March 25, 1943, Van der Hooft met with 
members of his underground network, Jo Satter and his father, in the 
outskirts of Doesburg. In their presence, Van der Hooft wrote a four-page 
long report in Dutch, entitled “Tötunsanstalten in Polen” – the one 
reproduced here which will be analyzed in part two of this article. The 
report was hidden in the chicken coop of the Satter farm. A year later, Van 
der Hooft was arrested15, as well as Satter and his father.16 Only Satter 
would survive. The farm was destroyed but not the chicken coop. Satter 
recovered the document there after the war, but kept it to himself. Why 
                                                     
13 Louis de Joug, “The Netherlands and Auschwitz” op.cit.. De Joug bases 
himself on a letter from Ubbink in November 1963. In addition the information 
on Van der Hooft et Trouw are mentioned in the same article. 
14 Trouw, March 19, 1943. This information was given to me by Henk 
Biersteker. I use his translation. 
15 Louis de Jong, “The Netherlands and Auschwitz” op.cit.. 
16 Letter from Henk Biersteker to the author dated November 4, 1996. 
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disseminate a document providing information that everyone knew about, 
at a time when, unfortunately, nothing could be done? 
 
Satter only realized the importance of the document in his possession in 
1996 when he was watching a television program presented by Lou de 
Jong on the occupation17. He sent a copy to the historian, who the next year 
revealed it to the public during his inaugural lesson in a Rotterdam 
college.18 Jong's retelling of this event left no room for doubt. “Van der Hooft 
did not send his report to the resistance newspaper Trouw, the only copy 
written in his own handwriting was hidden […].” His conclusion was no 
less scathing. “Three Dutchmen, three brave members of the resistance, 
had the privilege of seeing [this report] and – there is apparently little 
doubt on this score – all three refused to believe it in full.”19  
The footnote proving this assertion makes reference to a sentence 
written by Gerstein in his last letter to Ubbink, quoted above, but is 
unlikely that he was also including Ubbink. Thus the information provided 
by the first link in the chain of transmission – Gerstein/Ubbink – enabled 
Lou Jong to reconstruct the actions of the second link. The conclusion he 
arrived at follows directly from the argument which underlies his article. 
Expressed in a literary form by a maxim of La Rochefoucauld – “neither the 
sun nor death can be looked at directly” – Jong's feeling was that “The 
Nazi concentration camps only became a reality for most people – and in 
fact not completely – after they had ceased to exist, and even because of 
this.”20 Although in general terms this statement contains some truth, 
euphemistically speaking, it may be offensive to those who took part in 
these events, and illustrates the discrepancy which at times emerges 
between a witness' testimony and a historian's analysis. 
This is what happened to Jo Satter who always rejected this version of 
events. No, it was not because of his disbelief that the report was not sent 
to Trouw, but for another reason, difficulty of transmission, need to take 
precautions21…The manuscript was not given by Jo Satter to the renowned 
Amsterdam Instituut vor Oorlogsdocumentatie directed for many years by 
                                                     
17 Ben Van Kaam, “De waarheid bleef liggen onder een dakpan”, Trouw, July 
22, 1995. 
18 Lou de Jong. Een Strefgeval te Auschwitz, publikatie van zijn rede uitgesproken 
te Rotterdam, op 21 september 1967. An English version was published by the 
Yad Vashem journal, “The Netherlands and Auschwitz”, op.cit.. 
19 Louis de Jong, “The Netherlands and Auschwitz”, op.cit.. 
20 Ibidem 
21 Ben Van Kaam “De waarheid bleef liggen onder een dakpan”, op.cit.. 
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Lou de Jong but to a private individual who still maintains it in his 
possession.22 
 
Up until 1990, the history of this manuscript can be summarized in the 
following way. Until 1967, only the first link between Gerstein and 
Ubbink, was known, frozen in the memories of the disbelief with which it 
was (or they believed it had been) received. In 1967 the second link 
between Van der Hooft and Satter and his father was discovered. The 
interpretation of his role until 1992 depended on the memories of the first 
link, even though the only survivor of the second link refuted this 
interpretation. Finally in 1992, a young historian, Jim Van der Hoeven, 
discovered a third link23, vastly larger than the previous ones, which made 
it possible retrospectively to analyze the actions of the two previous links 
differently than Lou de Jong had done. 
On April 24, 1943, one month after the meeting between Van der Hooft 
and the Satters, another version of the report inspired by Gerstein was 
written. Typed on paper without an official heading, and with the 
simplified title of “Tötungsanstalten” this document has the sole reference 
number “Rappt. Nr. 61”.24, probably an in-house reference number of the 
Ministry of War of the Dutch government in exile intelligence service.25 The 
document probably arrived on April 24, 1943 or a few days before in 
London, perhaps by radio. None of the archives consulted by Van der 
Hoeven indicate the exact source of this report, but its great similarity to 
the almost identical report dated March 25, 1943, suggest that Van der 
Hooft had indeed succeeded in transmitting Ubbink's information to 
London. The discovery of this document confirmed Satter's recollections 
concerning the belief by Van der Hooft, himself and his father, in the report 
transmitted by Ubbink, but this discovery came too late: Satter had died in 
1988 and Ubbink two years later. 
 
The circulation of the report inspired by Gerstein within the Dutch 
government in exile is no less fascinating that its previous peregrinations, 
because the same figures are found in both, and the same reactions. I base 
myself on Van der Hoeven's article to reconstruct what happened to the 
document in London. 
                                                     
22 Information provided by Henk Biersteker 
23 Jim Van der Hoeven, “De Nederlandse regering in bllingschap wist al heel 
vroeg van de 'Endlösung'” Vrÿ Vederland, May 2, 1992. 
24 I am grateful to Henk Biersteker to have sent me a copy of the original upon 
which this description is based. 
25 This same secret service, according to Van der Hoeven, stamped the 
document. 
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The Tötungsanstalten report arrived in late April and was quoted and 
fairly extensively paraphrased on May 8 in the diary of the Minister of War 
Van Lidth de Jeude. The fact that he quotes the main pieces of information 
suggests that Van Lidth was persuaded it was true. This passage from the 
Minister's diary had been made public in 1979 by Lou de Jong 26who drew 
two conclusions. First of all he deduced that Van Lidth had been fully 
informed as of that date of the ongoing genocide, and secondly that the 
minister had done nothing to circulate this information. The latter 
deduction, based more on reasoning than on real archival work, was 
contradicted by a letter from Van Haersma, the advisor to the president of 
the council of ministers and the minister of wartime affairs (AOK), to the 
minister of Foreign Affairs dated August 16, 1943. In this letter, Van 
Haersma talked about “a report dated March 24, 1943 [sic]27 from a 
German SS officer, also dealing with the murder of Jews in Poland which 
had been transmitted [to him] by the intermediary [of] the War office which 
classified it as coming from a credible source.” 
From the Ministry of War, the Tötungsanstalten report was thus sent to 
the AOK at an unspecified date, between May and August 1943. The date 
it was sent is important, because it is indicative, on the one hand, of the 
rapidity with which the Ministry of War circulated the information and 
secondly, the duration of Van Haersma's lack of belief in a document 
containing such atrocious information. In the letter cited above, after 
having indicated the source of the document, he expressed the feelings it 
elicited in him. “My original doubts on the truth of the events described in 
the above mentioned report were substantially diminished by the letter 
from a Dutch civil servant28 in which he talks about “gassing” Jews in 
Poland. It seems to me that we should give credence to the horror of the 
information from the member of the SS.” The mention of a 'letter from a 
Dutch civil servant' enables us to put an accurate date on Van Haersma's 
change of opinion concerning the report inspired by Gerstein, since this 
document was sent to him by his correspondent in fact on July 21. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs thus transmitted to the AOK the documents 
concerning the extermination of the Jews, and AOK accompanied its 
response with a copy of the Tötungsanstalten report, asking for it to be 
circulated. 
                                                     
26 De Jong, L. Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, 
volume 9, Le Haye, Martinus Nijhoff, 1979, p. 561. 
27 It is likely that this is merely a mistake in the date: this letter was the only 
one that refers to a document dated March 24. 
28 This is an undated document written in German indicating that 'most of 
these Jews [deported from Holland] are systematically assassinated, initially by 
shooting, but now by gassing in the so-called “disinfecting installations.” 
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This exchange of information and documentation was not restricted to 
the above-mentioned ministries since Van Haersma ended his letter to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the following. “After requesting the advice of 
the Government service, I decided to contact the Interallied Information 
Committee to ask the committee to have it published.” 
This exchange of letters between Van Haersma and A. Pelt, from the 
RVD (Royal Intelligence Service) – the government service alluded to in the 
first part of the sentence – provides a means of tracing the information Van 
Haersma had available concerning the aftermath of his initiative to contact 
the Interallied Information Committee (IIC). 
On July 30, several days after having received indirect confirmation of 
the truth of the Tötungsanstalten report, Van Haersma wrote to Pelt to 
inform him of the contents of the report and to ask his advice. On August 3, 
Pelt responded and suggested transmitting the report to the IIC. On 
August 16, Van Haersma replied, sending Pelt a copy of the report and 
saying that he had followed his advice to transmit the report to the allied 
organism based in New York for purposes of publication. It is difficult to 
determine whether Van Haersma had already made contact on his own 
initiative or whether he was asking Pelt to do so. In any case, Van 
Haersma was waiting for Pelt to tell him what had been done. He 
contacted him on September 6, then on September 23, asking him to reply 
to his letter of August 16. Pelt only replied on September 27 to tell Van 
Haersma that the IIC was being restructured and that he would wait for 
this to finish before contacting him again. Our narrative ends here29, in 
uncertainty as to what happened to the report inspired by Gerstein within 
the Interallied Information Committee. 
Van der Hoeven states that to the best of his knowledge, the document 
was not published by this institution. The complex history of the circulation 
of the Gerstein report as well as its gradual rediscovery should prompt us 
to exercise extreme caution concerning hypotheses as to the fate of this 
document. Jean Potocki's striking metaphor is worth citing here: “The pilot 
who is probing at great depths and sees his rope spin out to the last 
fathom does not conclude that he has reached the bottom, but rather that 
he should not hope to reach it.”30 
                                                     
29 Nevertheless it should be noted that there was an exchange of letters 
between Sommer from the war ministry and a certain Drooglever Fortuyn on 
the subject of this report on August 10 and 16, 1943 which appears to confirm 
that this minister took other initiatives to disseminate the report. 
30 Jean Potocki, Essai sur l'histoire universelle et recherches sur celle de 
Sarmatie, Warsaw, 1789, p.89, quoted in Carlo Ginzburg in Le Sabbat des 
sorcières, Paris, Gallimard, 1992, p.387. 
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For several months - between April and September 1943, during the 
time we can trace its circulation, the report inspired by Gerstein elicited a 
series of reactions which adhered to a similar pattern each time. 
First of all was a period of disbelief, varying in extent and duration, 
overcome in different ways as a function of the distance of the recipient of 
the message from the original informer. Ubbink was persuaded of the truth 
of Gerstein's testimony when he saw the effect on his friend of what he had 
seen. Ubbink was able to convey his conviction to Van der Hooft, and then 
to the Ministry of War of the Dutch government in exile. The document was 
described as reliable and was quoted by the minister himself. Van 
Haersma, the next recipient of the document, was able to overcome his 
initial doubts by recouping with other sources of information and presented 
the document as reliable, citing these overlapping sources of information. 
Once disbelief had been overcome, efforts at the dissemination of the 
document were made towards individuals or institutions thought to be 
more capable of making the report public, or doing so more efficiently. 
These attempts, amazingly, ranged from the Netherlands to England then 
to the United States, although the different links in the chain were not 
necessarily informed of the outcome of their actions. Thus some links 
thought that the next link had prevented dissemination of the information. 
This lack of feedback and certain partipants' feelings that they had not 
been understood also influenced the way in which historians saw these 
events, in particular Lou de Jong. The discovery of new documents, partly 
through luck and partly as a result of systematic archive work by Van der 
Hoeven, help rectify overly hasty judgments and do justice to the more or 
less committed, more or less efficient actions of each of the links in the 
chain. 
 
The circulation of the report inspired by Gerstein also prompts a 
number of comments (as highlighted by Walter Laqueur and David S. 
Wyman31) on the crucial issue of the information available to the Allies and 
the neutral countries as regards the achievement of the Final Solution and 
reactions to this information in the political arena. 
The first comment concerns the fairly narrow margin of maneuver that 
the various departments of the Dutch government in exile authorized 
themselves. It is noteworthy that each link in the chain was able to 
transmit the information to the next link. However, is no less striking that 
none of these links seemed to have had the idea of bypassing the next in 
line, and submit this report which so terrified them to the general public. 
                                                     
31 Walter Laqueur, Le terrifiant secret. La 'solution finale' et l'information 
étouffée, Paris, Gallimard, 1981, David S. Wyman, L'abandon des juifs. Les 
Américains et la solution finale, Paris, Flammarion, 1987. 
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This adherence to established (or assumed) bureaucratic regulations 
leads me to the second comment, concerning the chasm between the 
recipients and the different actors in the ongoing tragedy. They do not seem 
to be living on the same planet, or the same time frame. The urgency is not 
the same. Between the end of April and the end of September 1943, tens 
and tens of thousands of people were exterminated in Sobibor and 
Treblinka (Belzec had already been shut down in December 1942)32 and 
more than a hundred thousands Jews had been deported to Auschwitz.33 
What would have happened if the report had been circulated more 
quickly, with greater initiative? In many respects this is a question which 
goes far beyond the scope of this article. 
 
II. “Tötungsanstalten in Polen” 
Written by Coor Van der Hooft, this four page handwritten manuscript 
in Dutch has a German title: “Tötungsanstalten in Polen” – “Killing 
Institutions in Poland” – and a date: March 25, 1943. It contains a short 
introduction concerning the author of the report, “a high ranking German 
officer” who swore that the facts he described were true. 
The rest, the report itself, is in the first person. The author presents 
himself briefly, and indicates the reasons why he was witness to 
exterminations. This introduction is followed by a description of the two 
camps visited, Belzec and Treblinka, without explaining the actual reasons 
for the author's trip to the southern part of the former Poland. Then follows 
the story of the extermination of a convoy in one of these camps, from the 
moment the convoy reaches its destination, the killing in the gas chambers, 
to the burial in mass graves. The author then makes an estimate of the 
number of victims killed daily in the Operation Reinhard camps, and then 
a provisional estimate of the number of people already executed. In 
addition he mentions the total number of victims. Finally the author 
mentions that there are plans to use cyanide for killing in the gas 
chambers of Operation Reinhard, presuming however that it had not been 
used. 
Aside from the level of detail, the report as a whole has an emotional 
tonality that bears the hallmarks of Kurt Gerstein. This tonality is also 
present in the report which earned him posterity, the one he wrote in 
several versions, two years later in April-May 1945. I will not make a 
systematic analysis or commentary on the “Tötungsanstalten in Polen” 
                                                     
32 Arad, Yitzhak, Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka, The Operation Reinhard Death 
Camps. Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1987. 
33 See the table summarizing the arrival of convoys in the work by Franciszek 
Piper, Die Zahl der Opfer von Auschwitz, Oswiecim, Verlag Staatliches Museum 
in Oswiecim, 1993, p.144. 
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report, but will simply make several remarks and suggest avenues for 
future research, for lack of space. 
 
In many ways, it is difficult to analyze the April 1943 report without 
referring to the April-May 1945 reports, since each document helps to 
better grasp the value but also at times the omissions or changes in the 
others. 
It is obvious that for example the 1943 report sheds light on those 
written in 1945. The structure of the testimony is absolutely identical34 and 
the introduction where Gerstein paints his self portrait is merely more 
extensive in the 1945 version than in the 1943 report. The report includes 
numerous items, which are either part of the prescribed sequence of events 
(for instance the arrival of the train or the gassing itself) or form striking 
details, like harmonics to the story (the little boy is pushed into the gas 
chamber in almost the same way in both narratives). Gerstein tells the 
same thing, which is natural, but he does it in exactly the same way, which 
is more interesting. 
This great similarity, in both structure and detail, suggests that the 
1943 report was a frame for the ones written in 1945, or more probably, 
that the two reports testify to the existence of a frame that served for both 
reports at a two year interval. What constituted this frame? One argument 
is that it was simply Gerstein's recollections, but this type of argument is 
insufficient. It is more likely that the frame is an organizing principle, and 
probably the ossification of recollections shaped by Gerstein's frequent 
repetition of his testimony to numerous interlocutors. The two written 
reports should thus be seen as two exceptional written versions of even 
more intense testimony, which in most cases was presented orally. 
The reverse approach is also relevant. The 1945 report helps for 
example better grasp what is only mentioned allusively in the 1943 report. 
This is true of the allusion to cyanide which can only be fully understood in 
the context of the 1945 report: Gerstein himself, as the chief of the medical 
techniques office in the Institute of Hygiene of the Waffen-SS was 
responsible for this switch. 
The 1945 report also enables us to detect the changes in Gerstein's 
testimony over the course of the various stages of transmission. Neither of 
the two reports written in 1943 are in Gerstein's hand, whereas he wrote 
the 1945 report himself. It is clear that although later, it is more reliable. 
 
                                                     
34 With the exception of an addition in the final version of the 1945 report, of 
more incidents, destined apparently to give an overview of the persecutions 
and way in which the participants in this persecution acted or reacted. 
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This is why it can serve as a reference for the two 1943 versions, in 
terms of their differences. These documents are clearly not derived from 
each other. The Dutch document dated March contains autobiographical 
information about Gerstein which was eliminated doubtless for reasons of 
security or anonymity, in the English version in April. Thus this latter 
version cannot be the reference document used to write the March version.35 
The reverse is also true. The English April document contains, for example, 
an additional allusion to Rauschning's book Hitler told me36 which helps 
establish cross validations with attested historical facts of Gerstein's life.37 
Since this passage does not appear in the Dutch March report, it is logical 
to assume that it was not the model for the other. These philological 
deductions - merely sketched out here, but which could be developed more 
fully - indicate that none of the documents was produced from another, but 
that they have a common source, direct or indirect, from which they 
branched off. 
 
This common source can also be assessed roughly for its degree of 
reliability to Gerstein's narrative as he must have told it in February 1943 
to Ubbink, and that two years later Gerstein wrote down. Take for 
example the figures indicated in the 1943 reports for the daily 'output' for 
all the camps, 9000 victims. It is clear that this figure appeared in the 
written or oral version transmitted by Ubbink, since Ubbink mentions it 
from memory, as of 1949, in a letter cited above, and this figure appears in 
the two 1943 versions. However the reports Gerstein himself wrote in 1945 
give figures of much higher magnitude (between 15 and 25,000) and, 
moreover, these figures do not apply to the extermination complex it its 
totality but to each of the extermination camps separately. It could be 
argued that the 1945 figures are exaggerations on Gerstein's part; he 
would have provided increasingly higher figures as he distanced himself 
from the event. I would like to argue the contrary, without unfortunately 
having the space to devote to it here - in my opinion it is much more likely 
that the figure of 9000 victims per day in the 1943 document was an 
alteration in the figures provided by Gerstein. This is because the figures 
appearing throughout the 1945 report written by Gerstein form a logical, 
coherent series even in its excessiveness in comparison to what we know 
                                                     
35 Simply because the March document was written earlier is not enough to 
eliminate this hypothesis. It is very possible that the date of April was the date 
it arrived in London, and the document could have been written earlier, in 
March, and been used as the reference document for the version dated March 
25. 
36 Hermann Rauschning, Hitler m'a dit, Paris, Pluriel, 1995 [1982] 
37 See Saul Friedländer, Kurt Gerstein, op.cit.., p.87. 
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about the history of the camps. The figures stated by Gerstein should not 
be taken as an accurate reflection of reality but as the accurate 
transcription of figures mentioned by the head of the camp to the witness 
Gerstein at the time of the events. The exaggeration, by Wirth or 
Globocnik, of the yield of the installations they were in charge of is 
demonstrative of the bragging that was characteristic for example of Rudolf 
Höss38. However, this bragging in itself constitutes a historical fact in itself 
which sheds an instructive light on the competition39 that took place 
between the two extermination complexes -- the Operation Reinhard camps 
on the one hand and Auschwitz and to a lesser extent Maïdenek on the 
other. 
 
This process of alteration of the original narrative, located here at the 
level of the first transmission link, Ubbink, can also be seen in the two 
1943 versions, which as was stated above, were written on the basis of the 
same document. The Dutch document dated March has a passage that 
does not appear in the English document dated April. 
“After the wagons arrived at the camp, the people were chased out 
with whips and in the surrounding barracks and locked in. The next day 
or several days afterwards, depending on arrivals, 700 to 800 people 
were pushed together into a courtyard.” 
This addition radically changes the sequence of the extermination 
process, which thus would have taken place the day after arrival of the 
convoy or several days later. In the English version dated April, as in 
Gerstein's report in 1945, killing took place almost upon arrival, and the 
various testimonies also indicate that killing took place immediately after 
the convoy reached its destination. It seems to me that once again, this 
change can be interpreted as a first sign of the chronic difficulty of 
Gerstein's interlocutors, and also of certain historians, to believe what this 
witness said in its entirety. 
                                                     
38 See the instructions by Rudolf Höss on Globocnik in Steven Paskuly (ed) 
Death Dealer, the Memoirs of the SS Kommandant at Auschwitz, Buffalo, 
Prometheus Books, 1992. In particular , Höss writes: “According to [Globocnik] 
his extermination centers operated much faster [than Auschwitz] and he threw 
out figures concerning his daily results. I remember him saying to me that at 
Sobibor they handled five convoys per day and that they collected valuables in 
the millions. His bragging was incredible on all occasions. I always had the 
impression that he really believed and was firmly convinced of everything he 
said. Through Eichmann, I learned that for technical reasons, only two trains 
could reach Sobibor every day.” (p.256). 
39 This competition is dealt with briefly by Raul Hilberg in La destruction des 
Juifs d'Europe, Paris, Fayard, 1988, p.773 sq. 
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To better illustrate this mistrust, it is worth taking a brief historical 
look at the way the text was received, by taking two examples fairly far 
apart in time. The first scientific publication of the Gerstein report 
appeared in Léon Poliakov's Le Bréviaire de la haine,40 published in 1951. 
The second example, published thirty years later, is the passage devoted to 
Belzec in the standard reference work Les chambres à gaz, secret d'état41. 
Although the different versions of the Gerstein report written in April-May 
1945 themselves contain several minor variations which do not affect the 
coherency of the document as a whole, it is obvious that most of the 
passages are repeated from one version to another almost identically, in 
particular the passage below dealing with the gassing itself. 
“The [gas] chambers fill up. "Load well" ordered Captain Wirth. [The 
victims] step on each others' feet. From 700 to 800 human beings in 
25 m2, in 45 m3.”42 
In Poliakov's quote of this document, the surface area of the gas 
chamber is changed from 25 to 93 m2, and this change is neither mentioned 
nor explained. Poliakov's reason, insofar as it can be reconstructed, 
doubtless involved a process to which the historian often has recourse but 
tends not to emphasize: common sense. How, indeed could one imagine 
squeezing such a large number of people into such a small space? It seems 
impossible, and even the eye witness, Kurt Gerstein says “Wirth was right, 
with the help of the SS, 750 people can be put into 45 m3, and the SS using 
their whips cram in as many as is physically possible.”43  
Poliakov's doubt concerning details on places reported in Gerstein's 
testimony take a fairly naive form is also found in a more subtle fashion in 
other historians' writings. Yitzhak Arad, in his chapter on “Operation 
Reinhard” in Les Chambres à gaz, secret d'état,44 preferred replacing this 
passage which he apparently thought lacked credibility, with the narrative 
of the same scene by another witness, Wilhelm Pfannenstiel. This 
replacement may have reduced the problematic nature of Gerstein's figures 
by simple omission, still managed to astonish since it is so obvious from 
reading Pfannenstiel's series of affidavits,45 that the witness had gradually 
                                                     
40 Léon Poliakov, Bréviaire de la haine, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1951. 
41 Paris, Editions de Minuit, 1984. 
42 See above, note 10. Note that in the most frequently cited version of the 
Gerstein report, the version in French dated April 26, 1945, which was included 
in the documentation at the Nuremberg Trial, reference number PS-1553, the 
surface area indicated by Gerstein is 20 m2 ( 4 x 5 m). 
43 Ibidem 
44 Paris, editions de Minuit, 1984. 
45 Most of these depositions are preserved in the form of copies at the Institut 
für Zeitgeschichte in Munich. 
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developed a systematic strategy of minimizing the facts and a point-for-
point challenge to Gerstein's narrative. 
The arbitrary change in the area of the gas chamber, in one case, and 
the replacement of a problematic story by a more suitable one, are 
complemented by a third case, from the Dutch report dated March. The 
change in the extermination sequence probably stems unconsciously from 
the same presumed lack of logic between a figure of 750 people and the 
area of the gas chamber. It is symptomatic that the area is not specified in 
the Dutch report. It is remarkable that although the Gerstein report 
prompted various yet analogous expressions of doubt from the start, it also 
motivated people to quote it, disseminate its contents and make efforts for 
it to be heard. 
 
The historian's task is clearly to attempt to resolve contradictions of this 
type, by a critical approach to historical sources. There is reason to 
presume46, as I suggested earlier, that the figure repeated by Gerstein was 
not necessarily faithful to reality, but adhered to the reality described by 
participants in the event; namely, the criminals at the time of the crime 
itself. 
When possible, the historian's task also consists of pinpointing the 
various levels of interpretation in recipients to the testimony, to define the 
layers of added meaning to better identify the original message. Only then 
do the unadulterated words of the witness come to the fore “with all its 
atrocity, its incredible brutality and its cruelty” – the words of the one who 




Killing Installations in Poland 
[Tötungsanstalten in Polen48] 
 
                                                     
46. Note that this analysis takes into account other documents which space 
prevents me from presenting here. In particular it is striking that the sole 
survivor of Belzec, Rudolf Reder, indicated in numerous depositions that in 
each of the gas chambers, 700 people were exterminated. This figure is thus 
very close to the one provided by Gerstein. It is unimaginable that one 
testimony could have contaminated the other, in other words that Reder had 
read Gerstein's testimony or the reverse. 
47 In all probability this is a code designating the type of document 
“correspondence” and the pseudonym of the recipient. 
48 The German terms found throughout this text have been placed in brackets. 
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The description below, in all its atrocity, its incredible brutality and 
cruelty came to us from Poland, accompanied by the fervent prayer to 
inform humanity of it. A high-ranking German officer guarantees its 
veracity: he made his statements under affidavit, and asked that the 
following be published: 
Following conversations I had with German officers who served in 
Poland and Russia, I heard the most fantastic horror stories. Having then 
received the notice of the sudden death of my institutionalized sister in 
law, I decided that I would have no respite until I knew what was true in 
these stories on the atrocities and the killings of institutionalizeded 
persons. All my efforts consisted of establishing contacts with high ranking 
individuals in the SS and to gain their complete trust. After months, I 
succeeded in visiting two of these so-called killing installations 
[Tötungsanstalten]. The first that I visited is located in Belsjek [sic] on the 
Lemberg-Lublin road; the second at Treblinka, about 80km north of 
Warsaw. There are still two other in Poland but I did not succeed in 
obtaining access to them. 
The above-mentioned two installations [Anstalten] are located in a 
deserted region of forest and heather. Seen from the outside, they are no 
different from ordinary concentration camps. A wooden door with some kind 
of sign, ending by 'heim' gives no hint of the den of assassination. 
The trains with the victims arrive from all the occupied territories of 
Europe. They are made up of cattle wagons whose windows are barred 
with barbed wire, in each of the wagons there are 120 people. Depending 
on the weather, about 90% arrive alive, although more than once last 
summer, 50% were already dead from lack of water. After the wagons 
arrive at the camp, the people are whipped out and into the surrounding 
barracks, and locked in. The next day or several days later, depending on 
arrivals, 700 to 800 people are pushed together in to a courtyard. They are 
told to undress completely, the clothes must be put carefully in piles and 
the shoes lined up. Completely naked, men, women, children are pushed 
along a passage between two dividers of barbed wire. Then Ukrainian 
criminals begin to cut and shave the women's and men's hair. The hair is 
collected carefully because it is used to seal the joints [Dichtungen] of the 
submarines [U-Boot]. For long hours, the poor people must stand in the 
biting cold or the burning heat. As soon as some fall, worn out by the harsh 
cold or the burning heat, the henchmen lash the naked bodies of these poor 
people with the whips. The pain and the suffering that takes place in these 
corridors defy description. Mothers try to warm their infants against their 
own naked bodies. There is hardly any talking, only the eyes of the poor 
people express a nameless suffering and dulled resignation. This corridor 
leads to an iron door of a stone building. The door is opened and the 700-
800 people destined for death are whipped inside until they are squeezed 
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like herring in a barrel and unable to move. A three year old boy who tries 
to run away is caught and whipped back inside. Then the doors are 
hermetically closed. Outside the building, a large tractor is turned on, its 
exhaust fumes are pumped inside the building by a small window, I could 
see the effects on the victims inside. Packed in, the poor people were 
standing and waiting for their last moment, there was no panic, no cries, 
only a low murmur that could be heard from outside, as though a collective 
prayer rose towards the sky. One hour later, all were dead. Sliding 
windows were opened from the outside for the carbon monoxide to be 
evacuated. A half hour later, some Jews came - they owe their life to this 
dismal work which follows - to open a door in the back wall and drag out 
the bodies of the gassed people outside, before carrying them to the pits full 
of lime prepared for this task. They must remove rings from the fingers and 
open mouths to pull out gold teeth if there are any. Each installation keeps 
statistics of the number of killings [Tötungen]. Every day, in other words, 
every 24 hours, three or four killings[Tötungen] take place. This means 
that for the four installations [Anstalten], 8000 to 9000 deaths per day. In 
all, 6 million and a half people have already been killed in this way, 
including 4 million Jews and 2 and 1/2 “institutionalized individuals” or 
so-called “Deutschfeindlichen”. The program includes 16 million and a half 
people, in other words, all the Jews in the occupied territories and all the 
Polish and Czech intellectuals. In high places, there is currently an 
emphasis on rapidity and it is planned to use a more efficient method of 
killing. Cyanide gas has been suggested but apparently it has not been 
used yet, so the killing continues to take place in the cynical manner 
described above. 
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